This toggle indicates whether restrictions are placed on exposing kernel addresses via /proc and other interfaces.
When kptr_restrict is set to 0 (the default) the address is hashed before printing. (This is the equivalent to %p.)
When kptr_restrict is set to (1), kernel pointers printed using the %pK format specifier will be replaced with 0’s unless the user has CAP_SYSLOG and effective user and group ids are equal to the real ids. This is because %pK checks are done at read() time rather than open() time, so if permissions are elevated between the open() and the read() (e.g via a setuid binary) then %pK will not leak kernel pointers to unprivileged users. Note, this is a temporary solution only. The correct long-term solution is to do the permission checks at open() time. Consider removing world read permissions from files that use %pK, and using dmesg_restrict to protect against uses of %pK in dmesg(8) if leaking kernel pointer values to unprivileged users is a concern.
When kptr_restrict is set to (2), kernel pointers printed using %pK will be replaced with 0’s regardless of privileges.source